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Natural Resource Contests and Precolonial Institutions in Papua New Guinea  
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the role that precolonial institutions play in relation to post-
colonial natural resource ownership contests.  Papua New Guinea provides a unique 
case study as it is recorded as having the most decentralized precolonial political 
institutions of any post colonial state.  After an examination of its precolonial 
institutions, colonial land policy, and three case studies, it is concluded that persistent 
highly decentralized customary political units coupled with customary notions 
inalienability of land, and overlaid with a state property rights regime, leads to 
resource contests.  It is concluded that resource ownership contests can have serious 
adverse consequences for resource management and that they are not easily overcome.      
 






In responding to the Commission of Inquiry into Special Agriculture and Business Leases 
(released in June 2013), the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Hon. Peter Peter O’ 
Neill, said: 
We will no longer watch on as foreign owned companies come in and con our 
landowners, chop down our forests and then take the proceeds offshore... For too long, 
landowners have been taken advantage of and had their land stolen from under them.
2
 
While it is true that many customary landholders have fallen victim to predatory companies 
and corrupt government officials, there is also a long tradition of customary landholders 
forcefully asserting their traditional property rights over those who hold state property rights 
over the same piece of land or natural resource, leading to protracted (and sometimes violent) 
ownership contests.  These contests have had significant consequences; they have led to the 
abandonment of one of the world’s largest copper mines during its peak production phase, 
reduced investment in agricultural projects, resulted in the harassment and eviction of small 
scale indigenous farmers, and seen eviction and compensation demands directed toward the 
state for the placement of its schools and other infrastructure (see Filer 1991, Koczberski and 
Curry 2004, Larcom 2013,  Shepherd 1981,Waiko and Jiregari 1982, and Standish 2001).  
This article investigates the underlying causes of these contests, by focusing on the role 
Papua New Guinea’s precolonial institutions play, and the consequences of these contests in 
terms of resource management and conservation.   
While there are many beneficial aspects to Papua New Guinea’s non-state institutions, it is 
suggested that there are two inter-related attributes that make them prone to generating 
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natural resource ownership contests; these are highly decentralized political authority 
structures and notions concerning the inalienability of land.
3
  It is proposed that these two 
attributes are particularly problematic when they interact with state institutions concerning 
the use and sale of land and natural resources.   
It is hypothesized that decentralized political institutions have important implications for 
group decision making that can generate conflict and ownership contests.  First, important 
decisions require consensus among the group as there is no central authority that is able to 
enforce a majority decision by containing the objections of dissenters.  If a consensus 
decision cannot be reached, those who object can continue to do so; leading either to a 
stalemate or internal conflict, which if significant enough, could threaten existence of the 
group itself.  Indeed, with weak central authority to enforce the decisions of the majority, 
there is little stopping some members reneging on a deal they previously agreed on; other 
than through the use of force.  Likewise, with no (or weak) central authority to adjudicate and 
enforce decisions, those who consider themselves wronged and wish to have their grievances 
heard have few other options other than to engage in ‘self help’ or simply break away from 
the political unit and ‘go it alone’. 
In terms of the inalienability of land, if ownership cannot be transferred outside of the 
political unit that claims ownership to it, its sale or even long-term lease is difficult.  Indeed, 
even if one generation may have formed a consensus over the sale or long-term lease of a 
tract of land, future generations may not abide by this decision due to a belief in its 
inalienability, and seek to take the land back forcefully.  Indeed, notions of inalienability 
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 Decentralized political authority is defined as where power is dispersed within a small political unit and where 
there is an absence of central authority linking smaller units to larger political units.  Inalienability of land refers 
to a situation where ownership cannot be transferred, especially to those outside of the political unit that claims 
ownership.   
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coupled with no (or weak) central authority mean that it is difficult to enforce previous 
decisions made by the group in question.  It also means that permanent transfers from one 
group to another (or a company or individual holding state title) will ultimately depend upon 
relative degree of strength (or force used)  by the disputants.       
Papua New Guinea is chosen as the subject for this investigation for two main reasons.  First, 
its precolonial institutions are recorded to be the most decentralized of any country in the 
world (Müller et al. 2000).  Second, it is unusually abundant in natural resources: with a land 
mass of 464,000 square kilometres, it has some of the most biologically diverse forests in the 
world and contains large reserves of non-renewable resources (Laurance et al. 2012).  Natural 
resource exports (gold, oil, gas, copper, silver, and timber) are the major source of its earned 
income and the World Bank (2015a) estimates that the full production phase of a new large 
natural gas extraction project (PNG-LNG) that commenced in 2015 has the potential to 
increase GDP growth by 20 per.  This could see it fill the gap left by the forced closure of the 
Panguna Copper mine in 1989 due to the Bougainville Crisis (see discussion below).   
The remainder of this article is as follows.  First there is a brief overview of Papua New 
Guinea, including its pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history.  This is followed by a 
discussion of its precolonial institutions.  Then, to understand the role of the colonial regimes 
on current outcomes, there is an overview colonial policy and practices in relation to land 
tenure.  This is followed by an investigation into the role that precolonial institutions play in 
relation to resource contests by focusing on three specific cases; land-settlement schemes, the 
lease-leaseback scheme, and the closure of the Panguna mine.  After a discussion of the 
findings the article concludes.    
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
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Using genetic data, Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) estimate that there has been approximately 
65,000 years of uninterrupted human settlement on the island of New Guinea, making it one 
of the oldest outside Africa.  This estimate also broadly accords with archeological and 
linguistic assessments.
4
  The Island of New Guinea was first settled from the north by diverse 
groups now categorized as ‘Papuans’, with subsequent waves of migration since, most 
notably by the Austronesian peoples.
5
  They are estimated to have arrived around 3,000-5,000 
years ago, with many heading further east to settle Polynesia.
6
   
From analysis of language (Mihalic 1989) and agricultural techniques (Zhang et al. 2004) 
there is evidence of extensive contact between the populations of different islands in the New 
Guinea region prior to European contact.  In terms of agricultural production, while 
generalisations are difficult given the diversity of land, landscape, soil and climate; the 
practice of shifting cultivation was widely practiced, where a tract of land would be 
cultivated for a fixed period and then left to re-vegetate.  Sweet potato was already the 
dominant agricultural crop of the densely populated central highlands when it was first 
discovered by Europeans in the early 1900s, while in other areas taro, yams, and sago were 
widely grown (Kambuou 1996 and Roullier et al. 2013).  In terms of living standards, 
Connell (1978, 46) describes the people of precolonial Bougainville as living in ‘subsistence 
affluence’ where they were able to produce adequate food for consumption with a ‘surplus 
                                                          
4
 Summerhayes et al (2010) found physical evidence of human settlement to almost 50,000 years ago. See 
Matsuda (2012) for a synthesis of the linguistic and archaeological evidence.     
5
 There is considerable linguistic and cultural heterogeneity among Papuan peoples.  For instance, compared to 
the one Austronesian language family there are 27 non-Austronesian language families spoken in Papua New 
Guinea (Lewis et al 2014).       
6
 See Fischer (2002), Kirch (1997), and Matsuda (2012) for discussions on the history and migrations of the 
South Pacific.   
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for entertainment’.  This assessment is also consistent with first records of the German 
colonial administration in 1886-87.
7
 
The island of New Guinea was sighted and named by Portuguese and Spanish sailors in the 
16
th
 century, however it was not until the late 19
th
 Century that what now makes Papua New 
Guinea was explored and colonised by Europeans.  Papua New Guinea was first colonised 
following an agreement between Britain and Germany to partition the eastern half of the 
island of New Guinea in 1884.
8
  Britain declared the southern part a protectorate and named 
it British New Guinea, while Germany took the northern part (naming it Kaiser 
Wilhelmsland) and the New Guinea Islands. In 1906, the Australian Government was given 
control of British New Guinea and renamed it Papua.  With the outbreak of the WW1, 
German New Guinea came under Australian military control following German surrender of 
the territory.  In 1920, Australia received a mandate from the League of Nations for its 
government under trusteeship. Apart from a three year partial occupation by the Japanese 
army during the Second World War, the two territories remained under Australian control 
(which were effectively administered jointly from 1949) until independence in 1975.   
Today, Papua New Guinea is a parliamentary democracy with a population of approximately 
seven million people.  However, the reach of the state is relatively weak and the vast majority 
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 The first annual report of the German Neu-Guinea Compagnie (Sack and Clark 1979, 20) that states:            
The natives cultivate with care and industry the gardens and plantations in which they grow the fruit 
and vegetables which furnish sufficient food for their needs.  But over and above their food 
requirements, which these gardens supply in abundance and without undue exertion, they at present 
have no needs and therefore no motivation to earn by labour the means to satisfy them. 
8
 The western half of the island of New Guinea was officially claimed by Dutch 1828.  They left it largely alone 
until after World War II and administered it separately from the Dutch East Indies.  In the 1960s, it was 
subsumed into Indonesia. 
8 
 
of its citizens live on smallholdings tending semi-subsistence gardens and cash crops 
(MacWilliam 2013).  Income per capita for 2012 is estimated to be $2,184. Despite a period 
of recent strong economic growth that was largely fueled by higher commodity prices and a 
corresponding investment boom, approximately 40 per cent of the population lives in 
poverty. (World Bank 2015b).   
PRECOLONIAL INSTITUTIONS  
As stated earlier, Papua New Guinea is recorded as having the most decentralized precolonial 
political institutions of any country in the world (Müller et al. 2000). The underlying data 
used to make such an assessment is Murdock’s (1969) Ethnographic Atlas. It contains 
quantitative measures for a range of institutional, economic, and social variables for 1270 
cultural units across the world.  He sourced his data from descriptions from anthropologists 
during 1890 to 1950 and explicitly aimed to exclude anything imposed by colonial regimes.  
What follows next is an overview of Papua New Guinea’s precolonial institutions in terms of 
political centralization and land ownership, using Murdock’s assessment as a reference point.     
Murdock recorded 49 cultural units in what now makes up Papua New Guinea. For his 
measure of jurisdictional hierarchy, only 3 cultural units (the Trobriand, Purari, and Aua 
societies) are recorded as having one level of jurisdiction above the local level (e.g. petty 
chiefdoms).
9
  All of the other societies identified by Murdock are recorded as having no 
levels of jurisdiction above the local level, which is the lowest level of jurisdictional 
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 Each of these are island/coastal societies. The Trobriand and Aua languages belong to the Austronesia 
language grouping, while the Purari language belongs to the very different Papuan language grouping.   
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hierarchy coded.  This implies that power was shared within a village and that there was no 
designated village head (or ‘chief’).centralized
10
   
There seems to be broad consensus among Papua New Guinea scholars that it was made up 
of thousands of small stateless and decentralized social units prior to colonization.  Perhaps 
the most compelling evidence for this is that this is what was found at the time of European 
contact (see Jinks, Biskup, and Hank 1973, Lawrence 1969, Rowley 1958, and Strathern 
1995).
11
  Indeed, Narokobi (1996, 28) considered that ‘small self-contained communities’ 
was the distinguishing factor of precolonial Melanesia compared to other places in the world.  
In terms of leadership and political structure, May (2004, 204), while acknowledging 
exceptions, concludes that Papua New Guinean societies were characterised as acephalous; 
‘lacking the formal, hereditary chiefly structures which typified neighbouring Polynesia and 
other small-scale traditional societies in much of Africa and Asia.’     
Curiously, May (2004) also notes that during the postcolonial period there have been a 
number of claims to hereditary chieftaincy in areas where there is little or no anthropological 
evidence of the institution ever existing. There are various potential reasons for this 
phenomenon, including measurement error in the early accounts of anthropologists; they may 
have been blinkered by their own cultural biases or have been given false information by 
their informants.  Alternatively, the result could be driven by some ‘creative rewriting of 
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 Murdock records an absence of class divisions for more than half of the societies (62 per cent), with 
approximately one third having wealth distinctions.  Four societies are recorded as having elite, dual or complex 
class systems (Buka, Trobriand, Mekeo, and Koita).  Early accounts of the central highlands refer to the 
existence of ‘big men’ and ‘rubbish men’ (see Brandewie 1971 for a discussion).    
11
The Neu-Guinea Compagnie Annual Report 1886-87 (c.f. Sack and Clark 1979, 19) states: ‘Larger 
communities under the centralized leadership of chiefs do not appear to exist. Up to this time only smaller 
settlements of a family type have been observed, which are not linked to each other and are frequently in a state 
of feud with each other.’ 
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traditional social structures’ (May 2004, 232). Many of these claims have been made by elites 
within the postcolonial state.  Whatever the reason for this phenomenon, it does cast some 
doubt on the early assessments that seems almost impossible to verify.  
Another problem with measuring the degree of Papua New Guinea’s precolonial political 
decentralization is that there are a number of data gaps.  For instance, Murdock only has one 
value for the whole of Bougainville Island, which is an extremely diverse place itself.  Lewis 
et al. (2014) report 22 distinct languages from three different language families spoken on the 
Island.  The value recorded by Murdock is for the Siuai people who are situated at the 
southwestern tip of the island. Murdock records no level of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond 
the local community and no hereditary chiefs for this cultural unit.  However, it is known that 
in other parts of Bougainville Island, chiefs and paramount chiefs currently enjoy 
considerable power and claim historical authority (Larcom 2013).  Early reports by traders 
also document the existence of powerful paramount chiefs in precolonial times; most notably 
King Ghorai who asserted sovereignty over the Shortland Islands and the whole Bougainville 
Island in the decades before it was annexed by Germany in 1889 (see Knoll and Hiery 2010 
and Oliver 1973 for primary accounts of King Ghorai).  However, asserting power over an 
area and having power over an area two different things.  While there are documented 
accounts of King Ghorai launching successful raids on Bougainvillean communities for 
defying his will, there is no indication that he ruled Bougainville in any practical sense.  
Murdock did not code specific rules relating to land and its transfer within generations, 
however Oliver (1973, 162-3) suggests there are five on Bougainville (see discussion below) 
and that have their origins in precolonial times. They are: different people own different 
property rights over the same piece of land (e.g. harvesting rights versus the ability to 
exchange ownership); the persons owning each set of rights tend to be multiple rather than 
individual; while some joint owners tend to exercise more decisive authority, disposal 
11 
 
normally requires consensus; permanent rights over land can be exchanged under certain 
circumstances, but such exchanges are kept between kinfolk (unless through force); and 
unauthorized trespass is taken very seriously. While great care must be taken in extrapolating 
these rules across Papua New Guinea, they do give some indication of land tenure rules 
within a highly politically decentralized society.  Indeed, the importance of the concept of 
inalienability of land and consensus decision making has been well documented in many 
other parts of Papua New Guinea (see Morauta, Pernetta, and Heaney 1982 and Nonggoorr 
1993).    
In summary, there seems to be little dispute that the vast bulk of precolonial Papua New 
Guinea was made up of small decentralized communities with few or no layers of 
jurisdictional hierarchy, where local leadership was largely competitive and dependent on 
personal qualities.
12
  Clan or family leaders or ‘big men’ (chosen for their personal attributes) 
usually shared power within a village (which was often a collection of hamlets) rather than a 
designated chief, and there was no level of jurisdiction (such as a paramount chief) above this 
level of authority. While there were individual land use rights, control rights were normally 
held collectively and land could not be permanently transferred to people outside one’s own 
group. 
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 May (2004, 209) in noting both the exceptions and the anthropological debates surrounding Papua New 
Guineas precolonial institutions concludes that:  
traditional leadership in Papua New Guinea can be generally characterised as largely dependent on 
personal qualities…substantially constrained by competition, by specialisation of leadership roles, by 
the prevalence of communal modes of decision making, and by communal demands on leaders and 
resentment of leaders who attempt to raise themselves too far above other members of the society. 
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The remainder of this article is focused on exploring the relationship between the precolonial 
institutions described above and current resource ownership contests, with a particular focus 
on the role that decentralized political authority and inalienability of land play.  However, 
first there is an overview of colonial land policy.  This overview is provided as customary 
institutions are unlikely to be static, and are likely to have been influenced by colonial policy 
and changes in economic circumstances.  Furthermore, there is a wide body of literature 
across much of the postcolonial world that links current land and resource disputes to their 
colonial past.        
COLONIAL LAND POLICY  
From the beginning of Papua New Guinea’s colonial experience both colonial powers 
expressed a desire to respect and protect customary land rights.  In the case of British New 
Guinea this dates back to Commodore Erskine’s proclamation announcing the Protectorate, 
promising that ‘[y]our lands will be secured to you’ (c.f. Biskup, Jinks and Nelson 1968, 5), 
while the first annual report of the German Neu-Guinea Compagnie stated its right to acquire 
land free of charge that was ‘not owned by the natives whose rights are to be respected’ (Sack 
and Clark 1979, 13).  While both colonial administrations did subsequently acquire tracts of 
land, they largely stuck to their promises.
13
 Biskup, Jinks and Nelson (1968, 100) report that 
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 As noted by MacWilliam (1988, 85) all colonial administrations (ie German, British, and Australian) had 
legislation in place to protect customary land rights.  The 1888 Land Regulation Ordinance only allowed the 
acquisition of customary land if the Administrator was ‘satisfied that it was not required or likely to be required 
by its customary owners’ in British New Guinea.  In  German New Guinea regulations were brought in 1904 to 
explicitly exclude ‘land under use’ from acquisition. However, it is known that some villagers on the Gazelle 
Peninsula and those near Lae were displaced by the early colonial administration, and it is unlikely that these are 
the only cases. (Biskup, Jinks and Nelson 1968, 100). In terms of the early Australian administration, Hubert 
Murray (Lieutenant Governor of Papua from 1908 to 1940) is widely acknowledged to have to made 
considerable efforts to ‘protect the Papuans in the possession of their lands’ (Biskup, Jinks and Nelson 1968, 84). 
13 
 
by 1936 over 900,000 acres of land were held by Europeans in New Guinea (the former 
German colony) and about 250,000 acres in Papua (the former British colony); which 
amounts to a little more than one per cent of the Papua New Guinean land mass.   
Determining whether the land acquired by the colonial administrations was taken from 
customary owners is not straight forward.  The administrations believed that there were large 
tracts of ‘uninhabited’ and ‘unclaimed’ land (Sack and Clark 1979, 13), that were often 
situated beyond the borders of different ethnic groups and which were deemed to be ‘no 
man’s land’ (West 1968, 129) or ‘wastelands which did not seem to be claimed by anybody’ 
(Hasluck 1976, 114).  However, some commentators such as Oliver (1973) have suggested 
that virtually all land had ownership claims upon it, even if it was sparsely populated.  In 
terms of land acquired that was recognised to have customary ownership, and therefore 
purchased, colonial administrations had regulations in place to protect customary land owners 
that were for the most part tightly enforced.  In this regard, MacWilliam (1988, 97) concludes 
that in relation to land for large scale coffee plantations in the highlands under the Australian 
administration ‘[s]trict procedures …were enforced to cover purchase of land from 
indigenous holders’.  Although Filer and Sekhran (1998, 30) suggest that the processes for 
land ‘purchased’ from customary landholders for plantations in German New Guinea were far 
less rigorous than that of later administrations.   
The development path chosen by the Australian colonial administration in the post WWII 
period up until the mid-1960s focused on increasing the agricultural productivity of small 
scale farmers with the aim of ‘[s]ecuring village life’ and to ‘check the formation of a 
landless proletariat’ (MacWilliam 2013, 11).
14
 This policy involved placing barriers, and 
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 Hasluck (1976, 126) stated that he ‘inherited a basic policy of preserving the land for the indigenous people 
and limiting the alienation of land to what was required for necessary public purposes and economic 
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even blocking, large scale enterprises that were deemed to threaten these aims.  Hasluck 
(1976), the Australian minister responsible for the administration of Papua and New Guinea 
from 1951 to 1963 faced considerable pressure to ‘free up’ land by expatriate and indigenous 
growers (and some administration officials) for plantations and other commercial enterprises.  
Hasluck also had a desire to obtain land for the indigenous population who were already 
landless, endowed with poor quality agricultural land, or faced population pressures.  He also 
held the belief that changing agricultural practices eventually required individual titling 
(including the need to use land as collateral for loans).  Despite these pressures for large scale 
land reform, and his own beliefs in individual titling, he took a cautious approach.  This 
caution was driven by both practical impediments and prudential foresight.  For one, he 
realised that the colonial administration had a very limited understanding of how customary 
land rights operated, and few resources to undertake a proper investigation across Papua and 
New Guinea.
15
  From the 1950s he was already well aware of demands from customary land 
owners to be given back land that had been ‘wrongly ‘sold’ to the Administration in former 
years’ (Hasluck 1976, 116).
16
  In terms of prudential foresight, Hasluck (1976, 124) was also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
development’.  Hasluck (1976, 114) stated that he ‘endorsed without question the long-established policy of 
protecting native land rights.’ 
15
 The slow progress made by the administration in registering customary land was a source of frustration to 
Hasluck (1976).  Difficulties included few resources and the complexity of customary ownership regimes that 
varied geographically.   
16
 Hasluck (1976, 116) concludes that these situations might have arisen due to a payment being made to ‘a 
person who may not have had the right to sell the land’; he also concluded that:  
‘It was plain that these disputes or grievances over land already alienated had become more acute with 
the progress of agriculture and the movement into cash cropping.  People were now coveting what they 
had previously disregarded.’ 
15 
 
of ‘the belief that loss of land would breed animosity among future generations’.
17
  Indeed, in 
the period immediately preceding independence the colonial administration did attempt to 
roll out a voluntary individual titling scheme, however despite having very little uptake it did 
manage to fuel local land disputes and claims from customary owners whose land was sold 
during the early colonial regimes (Filer and Sekhran 1998).   
As outlined by MacWilliam (2013), while the Australian colonial administration’s uniform 
development policy was largely successful in raising living standards across Papua and New 
Guinea and keeping the vast majority of the population on the land, by the mid 1960s there 
were growing pressures to accelerate development that would have implications for land and 
resources policy.  Independence was looming and there was pressure on the administration to 
secure an internal revenue base for a newly independent state.  There were also strong 
internal pressures forcing change.  While the vast majority of the population remained on 
their traditional customary lands, widespread small-scale cash-cropping had already led to 
greater individualization of land rights, and an emerging indigenous bourgeois that were 
beginning to harness state power for their own ends.  In addition, the claims of those who 
were landless had intensified and who had taken to squatting on mainly largeholdings.  
Following the departure of Hasluck and the publication of an influential World Bank report in 
1963, the administration broke with previous policy an embarked on an accelerated growth 
strategy, which included the establishment of agricultural nucleus estates and the Panguna 
copper-gold mine (discussed below).      
In summary, customary ownership over land was mostly respected by Papua New Guinea’s 
colonial administrations.  A commonly cited figure is that that around 3 per cent of the total 
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 MacWilliam (1988, 86) estimates that even with the post war land rush in the eastern highlands only 90,000 
hectares (approximately 222,000 acres) were alienated between 1953 and 1960. 
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land area in Papua New Guinea was ‘alienated’ during the colonial period (Morauta, Pernetta, 
and Heaney 1982) and large tracts were given up by the state following independence.  What 
is currently under state or private control has been either leased, purchased, or was deemed to 
be uninhabited. In relation to land that was puchased, colonial authorities often went to 
considerable lengths to ensure that customary landholders freely and knowingly entered into 
permanent land transfers.  In this regard, MacWilliam (1988, 80) considered that a ‘principal 
object of state power over the last 100 years has been limiting the land which is held as 
centralized and concentrated private property’.
18
       
NATURAL RESOURCE CONTESTS  
What follows next is an analysis of how the remnants of Papua New Guinea’s precolonial 
institutions can lead to contests over natural resources in the post-colonial state and the 
consequences of such contests in terms of resource management.  The examples chosen are 
resource contests connected to the land-settlement schemes, the lease-leaseback scheme, and 
the closure of the Panguna copper and gold mine (perhaps the most traumatic event in Papua 
New Guinea’s post-independence history).  The key implications in terms of precolonial 
institutions are then outlined in the discussion section.       
Land-settlement schemes 
Land settlement schemes introduced by the Australian administration and supported by the 
post-colonial state were deemed to be beneficial for a number of reasons.  For one, there were 
vastly different population densities and fertile land was distributed unevenly (Hasluck 1976).  
It was also believed that they provided ‘a means of individualizing indigenous land tenure 
and promoting economic development’ (Hulme 1982, 25).  As noted by Hulme (1982), the 
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 In the postcolonial period, while there were early efforts by Papua New Guinea’s new elite to further 
accumulate largeholdings, these mostly failed and smallholders were largely protected (MacWilliam 2013). 
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colonial administration believed that customary land tenure was unsuited to perennial cash 
cropping, discouraged individual effort, and was unable to be used as collateral for loans to 
raise starting capital.  In addition, he also suggested that the lack of clearly defined 
boundaries meant that customary land was more subject to ownership disputes.   
While there were a number of small scale settler schemes previously (Hasluck 1976), the 
nucleus estate schemes of the 1960s and 70s (where smallholder blocks surrounded a large 
plantation estate) were the first to be comprehensively planned by the administration.  This 
included careful planning in terms of choice of crop, scale, marketing, processing, 
infrastructure, and finance.  Once suitable (previously alienated) land was found, blocks were 
advertised and prospective settlers were interviewed.  Upon being selected, settlers were sold 
individual 99-year agricultural leases over blocks of around 5 hectares financed by the Papua 
New Guinea Development Bank.   
The first nucleus estate oil palm scheme was near Hoskins in West New Britain in 1967.  The 
settlers were primarily from the land short areas inhabited by the Tolais, Sepiks, and Chimbus; 
and community centres, schools, first-aid posts, market sites, government offices, church sites, 
and commercial lots were provided.  For Hoskins, Hulme (1982) estimates that the economic 
rate of return was approximately 25 per cent per year and that 95 per cent of settlers had 
repaid their loans within 6 years.  However, despite being a success in terms economic and 
agricultural returns, Hulme (1982, 34) reported that ‘[i]nter-ethnic fighting was a serious 
problem in the early years of the Hoskins scheme and a number of homicides occurred’.  
Another problem was that customary landholders surrounding the schemes were often left 
disadvantaged in terms of service provision and economic development.  In an effort to 
counter such problems later schemes, such as the Popondetta scheme, aimed to ‘assist the 





  However despite such efforts, villagers often persisted with large 
compensation claims on previously alienated land.   
In a more recent review of the settler schemes in Hoskins and Popondetta, Koczberski and 
Curry (2004, 364) found that newer generations of customary landowners continue to contest 
the legitimacy of previous exchanges believing that they have been denied their ‘birthrights’.  
They go on to document how subsequent generations see themselves as the rightful owners of 
the land and make eviction demands, compensation claims, or restrict the settlers’ economic 
activity (including a prohibition on the replanting of non-productive palms), even after they 
had been ‘re-compensated’ in some cases.
20
  These demands are made on the grounds that 
their ancestors were either not paid adequate compensation or did not have the authority to 
lease the land to outsiders.   
Lease-leaseback scheme 
The special agriculture and business lease-leaseback scheme (SABL or the ‘lease-leaseback 
scheme’) was developed by the post-colonial state in the late 1970s.  It enables the state to 
lease land from its customary owners for up to 99 years and then lease it back to them, utilise 
itself, or lease it onto others.  The main rationale for its introduction was that it provided a 
practical solution for customary landholders to utilize their land commercially by creating 
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 The promotion of ‘village oil palm’ has been a characteristic of all the major palm oil schemes in Papua New 
Guinea, regardless of whether they have resettled blockholders.   
20
 Koczberski and Curry (2004:364) report that: 
landowners have imposed restrictions on the economic activities of LSS [land-settlement scheme] 
leaseholders on their blocks, and have vigorously opposed the replanting of senile oil palms by settlers. 
Leaseholders are prevented from establishing small businesses such as stores and poultry projects, and 
are discouraged from harvesting too much oil palm fruit because if their incomes are perceived to be 
high, they become targets for harassment and monetary demands. 
19 
 
certainty of title which could then be used for collateral for loans (Numapo 2013).  
Subsequently, a number of customary owners have also leased their land to third parties for 
payment. 
Following widespread reports of dubious large-scale lease transfers and corrupt activities, the 
Papua New Guinean state established a Commission of Inquiry into the scheme which 
reported its findings in 2013.  Chief Commissioner John Numapo (2013) found that more 
than five million hectares of land (approximately 11 percent of Papua New Guinea’s 
landmass) had been leased to private entities under the scheme, most of which was over 
virgin tropical hardwood forests.  Numapo (2013) found widespread corruption and 
incompetence of government officials; he also found that many of the agro-forestry projects, 
which were described as clearing land (and selling the timber) for agricultural projects, never 
moved beyond the selling of timber stage.  Numapo (2013, 242) concluded that logging 
companies ‘mislead and deceive landowners with the assistance of corrupt government 
officials... literally pay[ing] off assertive clan leaders and then use divide and rule tactics to 
obtain subleases’.  As a consequence, Numapo recommended that the bulk of the leases he 
had been tasked with investigating should be revoked or voided.   He also made a number of 
legislative recommendations, including limiting the lease period to 50 years and 
strengthening the ownership and informed consent verification procedures of the scheme. 
While Numapo (2013, 242) highlights the presence multinational predatory logging 
companies ‘take[ing] advantage of gullible landowners and desperate for cash clan leaders’; 
this is not the complete picture. Filer (2012) concluded that while there were numerous 
unscrupulous operators who showed little intention of developing the land for agriculture, 
some did and were thwarted by claims from customary landholders.  He cites the case of a 
large bio-ethanol project that had been granted 99 year leases over two large tracts of land. 
Despite seemingly the best of intentions of its foreign owners, who established a 20 hectare 
20 
 
project nursery, the project had been placed in a state of limbo due to disputes with 
customary owners and squatters who continue to occupy the land.   
Closer investigation of the 17 leases that Numapo (2013) investigated shows that only three 
did not involve serious landowner disputes.  Six of the leases involved land that was subject 
to pre-existing customary ownership disputes; while most involved disputes between 
different factions of customary landowners, with some agreeing with the lease arrangements 
and others not.  While some disputes centred on a small group of customary landholders 
seeking to push through questionable leases with dubious companies without the knowledge 
or consent of the majority of landowners, others involved ‘disputes and arguments between 
landowners’ (Numapo 2013, 173); ‘rival landowner company[ies]’ (Numapo 2013, 98); 
‘irreconcilable positions between the two contending land owner groups’ (Numapo 2013, 
109); and ‘going it alone’ (Numapo 2013, 86).  In terms of the latter, Chief Commissioner 
Numapo found two cases where opposition from a group of customary land owners surfaced 
after the proper processes were completed and leases signed (and in one case trees planted), 
who wished to divide the lease and engage a different project partner. 
The Closure of the Panguna Mine   
Perhaps the most prominent individual example of a natural resource contest relates to the 
forced closure of the Panguna open-cut copper and gold mine on Bougainville island in the 
late 1980s.  The mine was opened in 1972 by Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), a 
subsidiary of Rio Tinto and was one of the largest in the world.  It had a capital expenditure 
of approximately $US500 million dollars (in 1970 dollars) and a construction workforce of 
over 10,000 people.
21
  During its production phase it employed more than 3,000 people and 
provided almost 20 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s entire annual internally generated 
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  However, during peak production, a group of frustrated local landowners led by 
Francis Ona demanded billions of dollars in compensation from BCL.  In May 1989, 
following bouts of sabotage the mine was closed and it has never reopened.
23
  The closure of 
the mine triggered the Bougainville Crisis that was effectively a separatist civil war followed 
by further fragmentation and fighting that spanned decade and cost many thousands of 
lives.
24
  It led to the destruction of most of the infrastructure on the island and the complete 
withdrawal of the Papua New Guinean state for a number of years. 
The Panguna mine was carved out of Bougainville amidst the backdrop of growing land 
shortages, social differentiation, and class antagonisms brought about in part by widespread 
cash cropping, growth in the individual control of land, and population increases (see Lasslett 
2012, 2014, Lasslett and Stańczak. 2014, Thompson 1991, Thompson and MacWilliam 1992, 
Regan 1998).
25
  During the lead-up to mining operations there was considerable public 
opposition and protest toward the proposed land acquisitions from indigenous landowners 
and expatriate planters (including the owner of the Arawa plantation). At the time, the 
Department of Territories (1969) was also made aware that monetary payments would be 
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 Thompson (1991, 81) estimated that in a full uninterrupted year of 1989, the mine would have contributed 30 
per cent of total exports equal to Kina(K) 430 million, 11 per cent of total GDP equal to K315 million, 4000 
direct jobs and 8000 indirect jobs, gross salary payments of K52 million, government revenues of K162 million 
and K22 million in employee income tax; 19 per cent of the national government’s budget of K184 million and 
foreign exchange earnings of K200 million (in 1989, 1 Kina approximated US$1.2). 
23
 Ona and his followers then attempted to succeed from Papua New Guinea by establishing the kingdom of 
Me’ekamui. 
24
 The number of people who died as a result of the crisis is not known with certainty: Hermkens (2007) puts the 
figure at around 15,000 (which is approximately 10 per cent of the population), while Larcom (2013) reports a 
figure of around 20,000. 
25
 For some authors such as Thompson and MacWilliam (1992) class conflict is the central issue in 
understanding the Bougainville Crisis.       
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insufficient to compensate indigenous land holders for the loss of their land and that 
resettlement would be very difficult.
26
   Despite these concerns, it was the view of the 
Australian government that individual rights would have to give way to the interests of the 
Territory as a whole.
27
   
Given the sheer size of the mine and its supporting infrastructure (including the need to 
construct a port, a large scale electricity generation plant, and a worker accommodation town) 
the mine operators required a considerable amount of land.
28
  The mine site itself was 
sparsely inhabited and great lengths were taken to minimise disruption to local landowners in 
                                                          
26 In a confidential note, David Hay (1969: 2) (the Administrator of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea) to 
Warwick Smith (the Secretary of the Department of External Territories) stated:  
The Dapera people say that even if they get the other land to replace that which is going to be 
destroyed by the mine, what guarantee do they have of secure tenure? It belongs to other people and 
even though the Administration calls itself the owner, won’t other people dispute that?    
This highlights the difficulties the administration knew it faced in displacing indigenous landowners to secure 
land for the mine.  It is also a frank acknowledgement of the existence of legal pluralism by the Administrator. 
27 In a letter to the President of the Planters’ Association of New Guinea (in relation to the proposed acquisition 
of the Arawa plantation), John McEwen (1969:2) the then Acting Prime Minister of Australia stated: 
The need to acquire land for a public purpose and in the public interest not infrequently occasions 
disturbances and inconvenience to the owners.  This is regrettable but the loss of the plantation and 
other land required for this project needs to be viewed against the massive benefits in terms of income, 
employment and revenue which will be generated in the Territory as a whole from the development of 
this project. 
28
 As outlined by Newman (1969), the BCL’s parent company negotiated an initial tax free period on mining 
revenue and a guarantee from the administration to grant the necessary leases for its operations.  The Mining 
(Bougainville Copper Agreement) Ordinance 1967 designated land required for the mining operation to be for a 
‘public purpose’ (Section 12).  If owners refused to sell land designated for a public purpose, the compulsory 
acquisition clause of the Land Ordinance 1962 could be triggered.   
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choosing where to locate the supporting infrastructure.
29
  For instance, the mine operators 
chose Arawa (the site of colonial plantation) as the main site to house mine workers and their 
families to minimise disruption to local landowners, despite there being more suitable sites in 
terms of climate and proximity to the mine.  Despite BCL’s efforts some landowners (and 
entire communities) were required to relocate their residences and gardens.  The residents 
were compensated in terms of lost property and income for the land that was acquired.  
Needing land to build the port, some landowners refused to sell and the colonial 
administration forced the sale and police were called in to remove the customary land owners. 
(Oliver 1973) 
The mine operators were compliant with the state property rights regime.  In addition to 
following due process in acquiring mining rights and the land for the mine, BCL also paid 
royalties to the state and local landowners.
30
  Thompson (1991, 75) estimates that the 
landowners received K22 million in cash benefits derived from royalties over the period 
1978-1987, plus an extra K1.2 million per year from the purchase of goods and services.
31
  
While the royalties received by landholders were small in absolute terms, they were not 
insignificant in per capita terms. Thompson (1991, 75) reports that when mining began, there 
were approximately 2000 people in the various lease areas, suggesting that royalties per 
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 Thompson (1991, 75) reports that when mining began there were less than 500 people in the vicinity of the 
mine site and a total of 2000 in the various lease areas. 
30
 Royalties paid were 20 per cent of the mine’s proceeds.  Of this 20 per cent, 18.75 remained with the central 
government and 1.25 per cent was paid to the North Solomons Provincial Government.  Of this 1.25 per cent, 5 
per cent was distributed to the customary land owners within the special mining lease area. Consistent with 
Australian law at the time, the colonial administration  (and later the Papua New Guinean state) were the legal 
rights holders of the minerals. 
31
 This compares to K919 million received by the National government, K75 million to the provincial 
government, K577 million to foreign shareholders; K6 million to other Papua New Guinea shareholders.   
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person were approximately K1,100 per year; well above Papua New Guinea’s per capita 
income at the time.
32
  
BCL also went to great lengths to encourage the participation of customary owners, and 
indigenous Bougainvillians more generally, in mining activities.
33
  However, despite BCL’s 
compliance with state law and compensating the customary landowners when they were 
disrupted, the land acquisition process largely ignored Bougainvillean customary institutions.  
First, Oliver (1973,162) considers BCL’s assessment that land where the mine site was 
situated was largely inconsequential to Bougainvilleans to be ‘tragically misguided’ (written 
well before the development of the crisis).  He suggests that all land on the island was owned 
or identified with one group or another, even if sparsely populated.  Oliver (1973, 79) also 
stresses the point that ‘the idea of permanent voluntary alienation simply did not exist’ and 
that the current generation considered ‘themselves trustees of such land for future generations 
of kinfolk.’  Some customary landowners never accepted BCL’s ownership over their land 
and resources.  Furthermore, many customary land owners could never come to terms with 
receiving what they considered to be such a small portion of the mine’s proceeds.  As noted 
by Oliver (1973, 164) ‘[t]he principle that the royalties paid on the treasure from one’s own 
land would be used for the Territory as a whole, and not for the land’s owners, or even for 
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 The Word Bank (2015b) records PNG’s GDP per capita at in 1989 at $US 874 ($US923 in 1988); this 
compares favourably to K1,100 (or $US1,320).  Note this does not include the additional K1.2 million per year 
paid in salaries and produce purchased from the landowners.   
33
 This included assistance with business development; subsidised training and scholarships; a preferential 
employment policy (and the rapid replacement of expatriate employees); and setting aside 8 per cent of BCL 
shares for purchase by locals. 
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Bougainvillians in general, was considered by some Bougainvilleans to be insanely alien’.
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These tensions were exacerbated as the mine grew in size; it had begun to permanently alter 
the physical landscape and emit high levels of air and water pollution.  For customary 
landowners, such developments led to growing resentment, and not just from those who had 
resisted BCL’s operations from the beginning.  Within this legally pluralistic environment, 
BCL’s property rights were challenged due to divergences between customary (precolonial) 
and state (postcolonial) notions of ownership rights and what they entail. 
Along with altering the physical environment, the mine also had a profound effect on 
Bougainville’s social environment.  Thousands of immigrants moved to Panguna and its 
surrounds to work in the mine and its support industries leading to a sharp increase in ethnic 
fractionalisation.  These workers came from all over the world, but many came from other 
parts of Papua New Guinea and were pejoratively termed ‘redskins’ (most Bougainvilleans 
have a distinctively dark skin pigmentation).  With the influx of large numbers of migrants 
(many of them young single males) social problems also developed, including increased 
crime and violence.  The ‘redskins’ were blamed which added fuel to an already pre-existing 
secessionist movement.
35
     
The royalty payments themselves also led to social tension and dislocation among 
landowners.  While K1,100 per person per year calculated from Thompson (1991: 91) seems 
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 As noted by Nonggoorr (1993), Paul Lapun, the member of the pre-independence House of Assembly 
representing the Bougainville mine area moved that 20 per cent of royalties to be paid to landowners.  His 
motion was defeated in favour of 5 per cent. 
35
 Hermkens (2007, 282) highlights the religious and moral elements of the crisis, noting that Francis Ona 
prayed daily to Our Lady; and that ‘the crisis is perceived as something that was necessary to circumvent the 




to suggest that the royalties were sufficient to compensate for loss of income (but not 
necessarily the health, environmental and social damage caused by the mine)
36
, he reports 
that households living in the lease areas only received compensation of K500 per capita 
(compared to the average annual return of cash cropping of K807), suggesting that large sums 
were spent elsewhere. Indeed, the board of the Panguna Landowners’ Association (the 
representative body for mine-lease area customary owners and responsible for the distribution 
of royalties) was perceived as being corrupt and self serving, especially among the younger 
generation.
37
  As noted by Lasslet (2012, 4), ‘[v]illagers accused clan leaders of having used 
their customary position to monopolize compensation, rents and business opportunities’; and 
it was these perceived injustices that helped Francis Ona and Perpetua Sereo to be elected to 
the executive of the Panguna Landowners’ Association and begin their radical campaign 
against BCL and the Papua New Guinean state.   
While there seems little doubt that the royalties were mal-distributed, Wesley-Smith and 
Ogan (1992, 256)  point out the practical difficulties associated with making payments based 
on customary land rights suggesting that ‘the formula for distributing such payments could 
not possibly take into account the traditional hierarchy of land rights’ that included both 
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 Thompson (1991, 78) notes that while there were significant improvements in public service provision 
(schools, hospitals and health clinics) there was also respiratory disease, environmental damage (including 
drinking water contamination), and anti-social behaviour (crime and drunkenness). 
37
 Thompson (1991: 82) describes the main grievance as being a: 
belief that the directors were ‘eating the money’ of the trust fund themselves; inequitable distribution of 
the income; the concern that actual expenditure of the trust fund on social amenities was trivial; 
irregular holdings of meetings and lack of information; and the belief that outsiders were manipulating 
the board.   
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primary rights holders and subsidiary claimants.
38
  Indeed, it is the view of Filer (1992, 115) 
that the ‘proximate cause of the rebellion was a process of social disintegration which has 
also threatened the political integrity of Melanesian communities (even in the pre-colonial 
period)’.  The mine increased economic stratification, distorted property rights, and led to 
arguments over royalties. This eventually caused the highly decentralized Melanesian 
institutions to buckle under the pressure with explosive consequences. 
DISCUSSION 
This article aims to investigate the role that precolonial institutions play in relation to Papua 
New Guinea’s post colonial natural resource ownership contests, and their consequences in 
terms of resource management.  In order to undertake such a task, it was first necessary to 
examine Papua New Guinea’s precolonial institutions.  While it was shown that precolonial 
institutions were complex, differed from place to place, and are not known with complete 
certaintly; the evidence does suggest that political authority was remarkably decentralized 
and land was owned collectively and largely inalienable.   
The next step in ascertaining the role of precolonial institutions in Papua New Guinea’s 
resource contests was to investigate colonial land policy; as interventions and antagonisms 
dating back to this era could be a source of continuing conflict.  It was found that colonial 
administrations largely respected customary property rights, and generally went to 
considerable lengths to recognise and protect them.  Where land was acquired, it was usually 
deemed to be either uninhabited or voluntarily sold.  However, it was found that state 
sanctioned property rights were nonetheless contested on the grounds of inalienability and 
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 Nonggoorr (1993: 440) concludes that [b]ecause customary rules do not identify individual landowners, as no 




insufficient authority of the original sellers (to represent all the landowners) throughout the 
colonial period.   
Following an examination of colonial policies and practices relating to land and natural 
resources, three case studies were examined to illuminate the role of precolonial institutions 
in relation to natural resource ownership contests; these where the land settlement schemes, 
the lease-leaseback scheme, and the closure of the Panguna copper mine.  While each case is 
complex and has multiple causes, highly diffused customary political authority and/or notions 
of inalienability interacting with state institutions played a significant role in each case.        
In examining the land settlement schemes, the continued existence of the institution of 
inalienability is highlighted.  It was found that despite the land used for the schemes had 
already been alienated, and that some landowners were‘re-compensated’ for their loss with 
the commencement of the scheme, state rights holders had their ownership forcefully 
contested.  In terms of the lease-leaseback scheme, it was found that in addition to rampant 
state corruption and the presence of exploitative logging companies, the remnants of Papua 
New Guinea’s precolonial institutions also played a role in generating conflict and contests 
over land ownership.  From a review of the cases before Chief Commissioner Numapo 
(2013) it was found that most involved disputes among customary landowners and that many 
of these had their roots firmly planted in Papua New Guinea’s highly decentralized 
customary political institutions.   The majority of cases involved internal conflict and that 
some agreements, despite the customary landowner group entering into them voluntary, later 
unraveled due to sub-groups choosing to ‘go it alone’ at a later time.    
These findings are somewhat less optimistic than Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2001) who 
conclude that legal pluralism can safeguard natural resources for vulnerable groups and 
improve land management outcomes.  In terms of safeguarding the rights of the vulnerable, 
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Koczberski and Curry’s (2004) account of the land settlement schemes suggests that it is the 
settlers (those vested with state property rights) who are the more vulnerable.  Generally poor, 
many invested everything they had in the small plots, only to have their property rights 
forcefully contested by the customary owners.  Also, rather than being passive victims 
predatory companies, customary land owners have proved themselves to be formidable foe; it 
seems that more than one unsuspecting multinational has fallen prey to the lease-leaseback 
scheme.   
In terms of the case of the closure of Panguna mine, while traditional landholders were 
compensated monetarily, they were marginalized.  It was by reasserting their precolonial land 
rights that were only partially recognised by the state, that their grievances were heard, albeit 
with tragic consequences.  Much has been written about the Bougainville Crisis and what 
caused it, and there is no clear consensus in the literature (Regan 1988).  For one thing 
Bougainville had a pre-existing secessionist movement; the mine brought significant 
environmental, health, social costs; and there were simmering tensions generated by land 
shortages and social (and class) divisions.  However, for some, highly decentralized and 
fragmented political units and inalienability played a crucial role in the crisis.  Nonggoorr 
(1993: 434) considers that the crisis ‘exposed the conflict of values and norms’, emphasising 
differences in customary and state property rights regimes including the notion of 
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 Nonggoorr (1993, 446) argues that a lack of central authority leads to ‘self-help’, ‘tribal warfare’, and 
‘physical disruption of investment projects’.   In terms of inalienability, Nonggoorr (1993, 437) also argues that 
‘land cannot be transferred freely’ because one generation does not have the right to dispose of it.   Nonggoorr 
(1993, 451) goes on to argue that ‘[e]ven if their land is acquired outright by the State with appropriate 
payments, landowners still feel that they have some (though undefined) rights to the land and the investments’. 
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In summary, it is suggested that diffused political authority at the local level coupled with the 
institution of inalienability, both of which go back to precolonial times, in large part explain 
each of the natural resource contests investigated.  Indeed, more generally, inalienability of 
land explains why customary landholders renege on leasehold and freehold agreements, even 
if they (or their ancestors) were willing participants in a leasehold or freehold agreement.
40
  
Highly decentralized institutions (even at the village level) mean that even when there is 
broad agreement a small minority of dissenters (who may have been present and agreed with 
the original agreement) can halt major projects or overturn sale and leasehold agreements.
41
 
The overall consequence of state institutions being overlaid on these institutions is an acute 
and dysfunctional form of legal pluralism that generates a repeating pattern of property rights 
contests, a point that has also been elaborated by Filer (2014).
42
   
While authors such as MacWilliam (1988, 2013) are right to point out that the policies and 
practices of colonial administration resulted in greater individualization of control of land and 
that the colonial administration oversaw a period where warfare over land were largely 
eliminated, it is argued here that customary notions over inalienability and ‘self-help’ and 
‘going it alone’ largely persisted throughout this period.  Indeed, the concept of legal 
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 Compensation demands are made over land used for public infrastructure, such as roads and schools that they 
themselves use (Standish 2001). Inalienability has been a longstanding issue; with Hill, Pernetta, and, Rongap 
(1982, 357) concluding that it ‘seems clear that people never feel happy about complete alienation through sale’. 
41
  Waiko and Jiregari (1982, 29) argue that the definition of the term ‘custom’ ‘includes fighting over 
resources’.  They also provide an account of how a group of Binandere people in Oro Province halted a Saudi 
and Hong Kong backed logging and timber operation despite most village elders agreeing with it.   
42
 Saffu (1992, 337) describes this phenomenon: 
In case after case...landowners made hefty compensation demands, backed their demands with threats 
of violence if not met by a certain date, did indeed resort to the threatened violence, and, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, ended up with some compensation... 
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pluralism centres on the possibility that two or more, often conflicting, institutional regimes 
can persist and coexist indefinitely (Griffiths 1986).  While the outward manifestations of 
these customary institutions may have abated for during a period of peak of state power, they 
nevertheless remained under the veneer of state authority.  Writing well into the post-colonial 
period Nonggorr (1993, 447) considered that most Papua New Guineans ‘continue to be 
regulated by custom’ and that ‘the government system with central authority has had limited 
impact on the majority of people’.
43
   
In terms of resource management outcomes, competing claims over the same resource 
(generated by the overlapping of customary and state rights) can lead to it being devalued by 
both groups involved in the contest leading to less investment, including in its protection.  
For instance, if small scale settlers cannot secure the proceeds of their labour and investments 
on their palm oil plots, if agro-forestry companies cannot gain access their leasehold land, 
and if mine operators cannot count on their mine existing in the near future; their assets, that 
they rightfully own under the state property rights regime, are largely worthless.
44
  In terms 
of resource conservation, given their tenuous ownership over natural resources in Papua New 
Guinea, there is a powerful incentive, even for those who are well intentioned, to exploit 
them as quickly as possible.  Indeed, this analysis suggests that this dysfunctional form of 
legal pluralism may actually create an adverse section problem, where firms focused on short 
term exploitative profits are attracted to Papua New Guinea but where firms that are willing 
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 More recently, Larcom (2015b) has provided evidence that customary institutions centred on wrongdoing still 
have widespread acceptability. 
44
 In the early post-colonial period, plantation owners were surveyed on why they were not replanting oil palms.  
Shepherd (1981, 6) reports the main reason as uncertainty over security of tenure. He concluded that [c]learly, 
no plantation is going to invest large sums of money in new plantings if it is likely to be taken over by the 
traditional landholders before a reasonable return on investment can be secured.’ 
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to take a long term approach are discouraged.  Likewise, if customary rights holders cannot 
secure their pre-existing customary rights, there is also less of an incentive to protect their 
natural resources from exploitation.  Indeed, there is an incentive for customary rights holders 
to also ‘cash-in’ their (contested) rights for whatever they can get.   
If Papua New Guinea’s land and natural resource ownership contests are indeed a 
consequence of legal pluralism stemming from the persistence of it precolonial institutions, 
the policy prescriptions to improve the current situation are not readily apparent.  While some, 
such as Lea and Curtin (2011) have called for the roll out of individualized land title across 
the country, it is unclear whether this would actually see any change in the underlying 
institutions.  Indeed, if the state property rights regime were to move further away from pre-
existing custom it may simply increase the number and intensity of the natural resource 
contests.   
An alternative path is one where the state, or private companies, bend even further toward 
pre-existing institutions. One option could see long term use rights exchanged for annual 
payments rather than going through the pretence of ‘selling’ them.  Such creative leasehold 
arrangements could see payments based on the profits generated from the land and natural 
resources in question, which would effectively make customary landowners meaningful 
partners in all commercial projects on their land. Such an approach would also require a 
change in the mindset of state property rights holders, who would need to acknowledge the 
reality deep legal pluralism that is found in Papua New Guinea, and maintain a genuine 
openness to continual dialogue and renegotiation.
45
 Paradoxically, such a change of approach 
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 An example of this could be the practices adopted by New Britain Palm Oil Limited, and I thank an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out.  New Britain Palm Oil Limited (2013:37) state that they are committed 
to ensuring that ‘the community really understand the implications and options of leasing their land’ and that 
[d]iscussions with communities are carried on an ongoing basis’.  Furthermore, they state that they do not see 
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could actually create more certainty for land users rather than less, as it would bring 
customary and state property rights regimes closer together and therefore reduce the 
probability of resource ownership contests.  Such a move would not be failsafe; as it would 
still require agreement over the customary ownership of resources, which is often not the case 
(see Banks 2008 and Filer 2012), but it may still be a step in the right direction. 
CONCLUSION 
Papua New Guinea is an extreme outlier in terms of its precolonial institutions.  This 
extremeness makes the transmission channels linking them to natural resource contests 
readily apparent, while perhaps being obscured in other places. While each case study 
examined above highlighted the complexity of natural resource conflicts in Papua New 
Guinea, and their multiple causes, each also provided evidence of the effects of highly 
decentralized precolonial institutions and notions of inalienability. These precolonial 
institutions, that remain largely intact, have been overlaid with different and competing state 
institutions.  This is so despite genuine efforts by the state to recognize and incorporate pre-
existing customary property rights into its own regime.   
The existence of multiple property rights over the same resources leads to uncertainty of 
ownership.  This means that in Papua New Guinea state property rights holders are not only 
subject to sovereign risk but also non-sovereign risk; owing to the very real risk of non-state 
expropriation.  This was evidenced in each of the cases examined; the Panguna mine, the land 
settlement schemes, and the lease-leaseback scheme.  Furthermore, there was also evidence 
presented (especially in terms of the lease-leaseback scheme) that tenuous ownership creates 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
requests for lease renegotiations and complaints as ‘conflicts’ but rather ‘part of an ongoing dialogue’.  However, 
they also highlight the problems: ‘It is not always easy to determine which individuals are truly representative of 
the community’ and that it ‘becomes more complex when we have to consider whether the rights of community 
minorities should supersede those of the majority’. 
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a powerful incentive, even for those with the best of intentions, to exploit natural resources 
faster than they otherwise would.  This may even lead to an adverse selection problem where 
companies focused on exploiting short term gains are drawn to Papua New Guinea.  In a twist 
to the tragedy of the commons literature, this suggests that too many property rights, as well 
as too few, can lead to excessive resource exploitation.   
One intriguing result from studying Papua New Guinea is that its precolonial institutions 
show little sign of abating in their importance.  Indeed, precolonial institutions may well be 
growing in strength relative to the state, in an ongoing process of decolonization.  If this is 
the case, and colonial institutions continue to be forcefully dismantled by their inhabitants, it 
is likely to lead to more property rights contests over land and natural resources.  Indeed, the 
resource rights contests found in Papua New Guinea may be a manifestation of a wider 
phenomenon of a rebalancing of power between strengthening precolonial institutions and 
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